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ABSTRACT
Literature exploring other-regarding behavior reveals interesting phenomena, yet less attention has
been given to implications for foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes
the evidence, explaining why recent work challenges rational choice theory as well as its special
case, convex preference theory. Guided by this understanding, we advance a theory of choice that
exhibits monotonicity with respect to observable reference points. This modification of choice
theory establishes consistency with otherwise-anomalous data. We explain how our theory
organizes extant data and has applications to strategic games with contractions. We report an
experiment designed to test central features of the new theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most influential bodies of economics research in the past two decades revolves around
whether and to what extent people value efficiency, fairness, equity, and reciprocity. Experimental
work has provided evidence that such motivations can be important in creating and determining
surplus allocations in markets (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Bandiera et al., 2005; Landry et al.,
2010; Cabrales et al., 2010; Hertz and Taubinsky, 2017), with accompanying theoretical models
of social preferences providing a framework to rationalize such behaviors (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993;
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008; Fudenberg
and Levine, 2012; Celen et al., 2017; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017).
Within this line of research, pro-social preferences have been measured using a class of
experiments taking the form of dictator games, gift exchange games, public goods games,
ultimatum games, and trust games. Such games have shown that social preferences touch many
areas of economic interactions, and the received literature suggests that observed sharing behaviors
are consonant with existing theory. For instance, in a seminal study, Andreoni and Miller (2002)
show that in a modified dictator game subjects’ choices satisfy the key axiom of revealed
preference theory.1 More recently, Andersen et al. (2011) provide data that reveals demand curves
for fairness in an ultimatum game are downward sloping.
The shortage of work challenging basic tenets in the sharing literature contrasts sharply
with other areas of behavioral economics, which have lent deep insights into foundational
assumptions within economics. For example, for riskless choice, received results reveal that many
consumers have preferences defined over changes in consumption, but individual behavior
converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies (see, e.g., Kahneman et
al., 1990; List, 2004; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).
Relatedly, for choice that involves risk, several scholars (see, e.g., Harless, 1992; Hey and
Orme, 1994) present econometric estimates of indifference curves under risk at the individual level
that show neither expected utility theory nor the non-expected utility alternatives do a satisfactory
job of organizing behavior. Choi et al. (2007) extend this analysis by developing an experimental
protocol that allows the researcher to both test the consistency of choices with the assumption of
utility maximization and estimate a two-parameter utility function for each individual. These
1

Fisman et al. (2007) extend this earlier work by developing an experimental framework that allows the researcher to
not only test the consistency of choices but also recover individual level preferences for giving. Fisman et al. (2015)
explore how preferences for giving are impacted by macroeconomic shocks.
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examples are not exhaustive, as there are many other active research inquiries in this spirit,
including those exploring intertemporal choice (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002), asymmetry and transitivity of preferences (Tversky, 1969;
Slovic 1995; Cox and Grether, 1996; List, 2002), and conditional altruism (Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008).
Our study follows the spirit of this broader literature by exploring whether basic economic
tenets are satisfied in sharing choices as observed in the dictator game. To understand more deeply
the factors that motivate sharing, a number of scholars have augmented the standard dictator game
by varying the feasible action set (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen, et al., 2013; Korenok,
et al., 2014). These studies report that dictators change their allocations in interesting ways when
presented a chance to take as well as to give to others. For example, in the typical dictator game
the experiment is framed such that “giving nothing” is the least generous act, and substantial sums
of money are given away (Engel, 2011). Yet, research shows that if subjects are allowed to give
or take money from the other player, they give much less to the other player on average.2
The first goal of our study is to step back from the burgeoning literature and attempt to
synthesize what we have learned from the experimental exercises of List (2007) and others. We
explain that the traditional dictator game, wherein more than 60 percent of dictators pass a positive
amount of money, is consistent with neoclassical convex preference theory (Hicks, 1946;
Samuelson, 1947). Yet, more recent results from this literature (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008;
Cappelen, et al., 2013) provide evidence that challenges convex preference theory.3 An even more
fundamental challenge, to the foundation of rational choice theory, is provided by data from one
of the treatments in Korenok, et al. (2014) that is inconsistent with the Contraction Consistency
Axiom, which for singleton choice sets is the necessary and sufficient condition for a choice
function to be rationalizable by a complete and transitive ordering (Sen, 1971).4
Building upon this discussion, we advance an axiomatic theory of moral reference points
that is consistent with otherwise-anomalous data from prior experiments. Our theoretical
development follows the approach in Cox and Sadiraj (2010) to extend choice theory to
accommodate dictator game data that violates a central tenet of conventional theory – in this case,
2

This sentiment is well reflected by Zhang and Ortmann (2014) who report results from a meta-analysis of dictator
games that allow a taking option and find, “…an economically and statistically significant negative effect on giving…”
3
See also experiments by Grossman and Eckel, 2015, Engel, 2011; Korenok et al., 2013; Korenok et al., 2014; Zhang
and Ortmann, 2014.
4
For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Consistency Axiom states that if x is chosen from feasible set F then it
will also be chosen from any contraction of set F that contains x. For set-valued choice functions, rationality is
equivalent to Sen’s (1971) Properties α and β (see below), where Property α is the Contraction Consistency Axiom.
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the Contraction Consistency Axiom. A key component of our theory is the identification of moral
reference points that are a priori observable features of feasible sets and initial endowments.5
We then design an experiment to test the defining property of the new theory –
monotonicity in choice with respect to the dimensions that define moral reference points. Results
from our experiment provide support for the importance of moral reference points on observed
patterns of sharing. In contrast, the data are at odds with the standard model of rational choice and
any model that assumes convex preferences. We view our study as fitting in nicely with the “theory
speaking to experiment and experiment speaking to theory” research culture that has permeated
experimental economics for decades.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the implications for
theory of distinct types of dictator games in previous literature that challenge: (a) homo
economicus convex preference theory; (b) other-regarding convex preference theory; and (c)
general rational choice theory. Section 3 presents new theory motivated by distinct features of type
(b) and type (c) dictator games. Section 4 presents the design of our experiment intended to
discriminate between the new theory and traditional theory. Section 5 presents our experimental
results. Section 6 presents implications of our theory for related experiments in Andreoni and
Miller (2002), Korenok, et al. (2014), Krupka and Weber (2013), Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber
(2012), and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008). Section 7 explains how our theory can be applied to
strategic games with contractions and presents applications to moonlighting and investment games
and to carrot/stick, carrot, and stick games. Section 8 concludes.
2. WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT THEORY FROM DICTATOR EXPERIMENTS?
2.1 Experiments in which Behavior is Inconsistent with (Universal) Selfish Preferences
Kahneman et al. (1986) was the first to conduct a dictator game experiment in economics, giving
subjects a hypothetical choice of choosing an even split of $20 ($10 each) with an anonymous
subject or an uneven split ($18, $2), favoring themselves. Three-quarters of the subjects opted for
the equal split. The wheels were set in motion for three decades of research examining sharing and
allocation of surplus in the lab and field. One stylized result that has emerged from the large
literature is that more than 60 percent of subjects pass a positive amount to their anonymous
partners and, on average, give more than 25 percent of the total available (Engle, 2011).

5

Moral cost models have been suggested in previous work (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Kessler
and Leider, 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015.
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Even though some scholars have argued that such giving patterns violate deeply held
economic doctrines, it is important to recall that preference order axioms do not uniquely identify
the commodity bundles. In a two-commodity case, for example, my preferences may be defined
over my hotdogs and my hamburgers. But the same formal theory of preferences can be applied to
two commodities identified as my hamburgers and your hamburgers. Identification of the
commodities in a bundle is an interpretation of the theory. In this way convex preference theory,
either developed as neoclassical preference theory (Hicks, 1946; Samuelson, 1947) or revealed
preference theory (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982) can be used for agents who are either self-regarding
or other-regarding. As such, the received results of giving in standard dictator games do not
represent a rejection of convex preference theory. Rather, they represent a rejection of a joint
hypothesis: convex preferences and the assumption that preferences are self-regarding.
2.2 Experiments in which Behavior is Inconsistent with Convex Preference Theory
More recently, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), amongst others, have used laboratory dictator
game experiments to explore how choices are influenced by introducing opportunities for the
dictator to take from another subject. This line of work does present a challenge for convex
preference theory, as we explain.
Consider, for example, Figure 1, which shows data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008).6
Previous discussions of List’s data have focused on comparing the 29% of choices of 0 in the
Baseline (standard dictator game allowing giving up to $5) treatment with the 65% of the choices
of -1 or 0 in the Take 1 treatment (standard dictator game augmented to allow taking $1 from the
recipient). An implication of convexity is that these figures should be the same – a pattern that the
data clearly refutes.7 Convex preference theory also implies that the choices that are in the interior
of the feasible sets for both the Baseline and Take 1 treatments should be the same. The data are
also inconsistent with this prediction of convex preference theory. Data from Bardsley (2008) and
from the experiment with a representative sample of Danish adult subjects reported by Cappelen,
et al. (2013) are also clearly inconsistent with convex preference theory.
Popular models of social preferences, including inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin (Charness and Rabin 2002), CES (Andreoni
and Miller 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj 2007), have the same implication as

6

The data for List (2007) are from the JPE online appendix.
The initial endowments are the same in the two treatments so we can discuss implications of convex preference
theory for either payoffs or transfers.
7

6
traditional convex preference theory for comparisons such as the 29% vs. 65% choices in List’s
experiment. Therefore these models are also called into question by the dictator game data.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE: Histograms for List and Bardsley Data]
Convexity, however, is not a necessary condition for choice rationality, so comparisons
such as the above for the List and Bardsley data do not allow the researcher to draw conclusions
about choice rationality. An illustration of rational choices for non-convex preferences is shown
in Figure 2. Let the endowment be at point B and the feasible set be [A,B] in the give game and the
choice be at point y. In the give or take game, let the endowment be at point B and the feasible set
be [A,C] and the choice be at point x.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE: Example of Choice with non-Convex Preferences]
Choice implied by convex preferences and rational choice are different concepts. Convex
preference theory is a special case of rational choice theory that imposes far stronger restrictions
on observable choices. Rational choice theory requires that choices satisfy consistency
(contraction and expansion) axioms (Samuelson, 1938; Chernoff, 1954; Arrow, 1959; Sen, 1971,
1986). If we let C(S) denote the choice set when the feasible set is S and C(T), be the choice set
when the feasible set is T then the Contraction Consistency Axiom (also known as Property 
from Sen 1971, 1993) states: For any feasible sets S and T and choice sets C(S) and C(T),
CCA: [ x  C(S ) and x T  S ]  x  C(T ).
In words, any allocation x C(S) that is chosen from S is also chosen from any subset T of S that
contains x. With single-valued choice functions, CCA is the necessary and sufficient condition for
existence of a complete and transitive ordering of choices (Sen, 1971).
The feasible set for the Baseline treatment in List (2007) is a contraction of the set for the
Take 1 treatment. Therefore, by CCA, anyone choosing an amount from $0 to $5 in the Take 1
treatment should make the same choice in the Baseline treatment. In contrast to the special case of
convex preferences, rational choice theory offers no suggestions for the Baseline treatment if one
is observed to choose -$1 in the Take 1 treatment. Rational choice theory: (a) can accommodate
someone who takes in the Take 1 treatment and gives in the Baseline treatment; but (b) cannot
accommodate someone who gives different amounts in the Take 1 and Baseline treatments.
The above properties of rational choice theory imply that each of the bars portraying
fractions of choices of $0 to $5 in the Take 1 treatment should not be higher than the corresponding
bar for choices in the Baseline. With the exception of the bar at $1.50 (corresponding to two
observations in the Take 1 treatment), the List (2007) data are consistent with rational choice
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theory. Similarly, data shown in Figure 1 from Experiment 2 conducted by Bardsley (2008) are
inconsistent with convex preferences but are mostly consistent with rational choice theory; the bar
at $1.50 (2 observations) is the only inconsistency with rational choice theory in Experiment 2.
2.3 Experiment in which Behavior is Inconsistent with Rational Choice Theory
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment that explores the effects of changing
endowments and varying give and take actions while holding constant the feasible set of payoffs.
Figure 3 illustrates five different scenarios in the Korenok et al. experiment. In all five scenarios,
the feasible set is the same set of discrete points on the budget line shown in Figure 3. What varies
across scenarios is the initial (endowed) allocation of $20 between the dictator and the recipient.
We represent these scenarios using the numbered points on the budget line in Figure 3. For
example, in scenario 1, the dictator is endowed with $20 and the recipient with $0. In scenario 9,
the recipient is endowed with $20 and the dictator with $0. Other endowments used in the
experiment are shown at points 3, 6, and 8 on the budget line.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: Endowments and Choices in Korenok, et al.]
CCA implies that choices will be invariant to changes in the endowments in the
experiment: for any two endowments, the choice sets F and G are the same set. Let S1 ($4.05)
denote the average payoff of $4.05 to the recipient in scenario 1. Using this same convention to
reflect payoffs in the remaining scenarios, we have that the average recipient payoffs for the five
scenarios are: S1 ($4.05), S3 ($5.01), S6 ($5.61), S8 ($6.59), and S9 ($6.31). The differences
between these payoff figures are statistically significant except for the comparison of S8 with S9.
The fact that average payoffs differ across endowments is inconsistent with predictions from CCA.
Actually, the inconsistency with rational choice theory is even more fundamental that
inconsistency with CCA. Choice variability with endowments, when the feasible set is invariant,
is inconsistent with existence of a (single-valued) choice function.
3. MORAL MONOTONICITY THEORY

The empirical failure of standard theory with data from these simple dictator games suggests that
new theory that formalizes somewhat different empirical content is needed. A framework that has
been used to describe giving, taking, and related behaviors builds upon the notion of moral cost
(Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2007; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2012) or concern for norm
compliance (Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov,
2015). Using this framework, individuals are said to share with others to avoid experiencing moral
cost from failing to do so or from taking actions that are deemed socially inappropriate. We put
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this approach on an axiomatic foundation that follows from initial work by Cox and Sadiraj (2010).
There are two central features of this approach: (1) definition of Moral Monotonicity
Axiom (MMA) that is equivalent to the traditional Contraction Consistency Axiom (CCA) when
contractions preserve the moral reference point; and (2) definition of moral reference points that
are observable features of feasible sets. We first define and explain MMA. Subsequently, we
develop a concept of moral reference points suggested by features of dictator games that produce
data anomalous for traditional rational choice theory.
3.1 Moral Monotonicity Axiom
It is natural to expect that choices are monotonic on moral reference points; that is, the more
favorable the moral reference point to an agent the larger the allocation to that agent chosen by
himself or another, everything else equal. Let f * be chosen from some feasible set F and G a
subset of F that contains it. Let r G and r F denote moral reference points for feasible sets G and
F, with choice sets G* and F*, and suppose they differ from each other only with respect to the
value of dimension i . If the moral reference point in G is more favorable to individual i, then we
postulate that no choice from G allocates i less than f *. Similarly, if the moral reference point in
G is less favorable to individual i , then no choice from G allocates i more than f *. Formalizing
this, if we let  denote “not smaller” or “not larger”, then for every individual

:

MORAL MONOTONICITY AXIOM (MMA):
If

G  F , riG riF and rGi  rFi , then f *  F*  G  gi  fi , g G*

What are the implications of MMA for contractions that preserve moral reference points
and contain choices from the bigger set? For such subsets MMA implies that the choice set is a
singleton and that conventional axioms of rationality (Sen’s 1971 Properties  and  ) are
satisfied. The modified form of Sen’s Property

(a.k.a. CCA) for sets that preserve the moral

reference point is8
PROPERTY  M : if G  F and r G  r F then F *  G  G *
For singleton choice sets, this requires f * to be the chosen allocation in any subset, G of F that
contains f *. Implications of MMA for choices is stated in the following proposition.9
8

For non-singleton choice sets, the analogue of Sen’s (1971) Property β is Property βM: if G  F and r G  r F then

G*  F*   implies G*  F * .
9

The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A also shows that MMA implies Property βM ..
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PROPOSITION 1: MMA implies Property  M
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Thus, for opportunity sets that preserve moral reference points, MMA suffices for choices to be
rationalizable. Implications of MMA for a variety of dictator games and for play in strategic games
with contractions are discussed in sections 6 and 7.
3.2 Moral Reference Points
Ideas about what may constitute a moral reference point are suggested by the idiosyncratic features
of designs of (a) the Korenock (2014) experiment; and (b) the List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)
experiments. All of these experiments include taking as well as giving opportunities. The
Korenock, et al. experiment varies the dictator’s endowment while holding constant the minimum
(resp. maximum) payoff of each agent at 0 (resp. 20). Their data suggests that dependence of
choices on dictator’s endowment in a way not captured by traditional theory is empirically
significant.10 In contrast, the paired baseline and take treatments in each of the List and Bardsley
experiments hold constant the dictator’s endowment while varying the minimum and maximum
payoffs. Taken together, these experiments inform that choice behavior is dependent on (a) the
dictator’s endowment and (b) the maximum and minimum payoffs available in the game. We
define moral reference points in a way that is suggested by this experimental literature.
Our definition of moral reference point incorporates two intuitions into theory of choice:
that my moral constraints on interacting with you in “the game” we are playing may depend on (a)
my endowed (or initial) payoff in the game and (b) the payoff each of us can receive when the
other’s payoff is maximized (a.k.a. our “minimal expectation payoffs”). Intuition (a) reflects the
idea that my moral cost from making a choice that benefits me at your expense decreases with the
closeness of my final payoff to my endowed (“status quo”) payoff: my “property right.”11 Intuition
(b) reflects the idea that my moral cost from making such a choice:

10

In the various treatments, the sum of the dictator’s and recipient’s endowments is held constant. Hence the
dependence on endowment could instead be defined on dictator’s endowment. Assumed dependence on both
endowments would be an over-determined miss-specification because they sum to a constant.
11
The intuition that “property rights” matter for final allocations in a dictator game is consistent with results in Oxoby
and Spraggon (2008) and Korenok et al. (2017) who show that dictators share more with the recipient when the total
endowment was earned by the actions of the recipient as opposed to the dictator themselves. It is also consistent with
results from the meta-analysis in Engel (2011) showing that transfers in dictator games are significantly greater when
the recipient earns the endowment.
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(i)

decreases with the (positive) difference between your final payoff and your
minimal expectation payoff − how much more do I give you than the minimum you
can expect from the game; and

(ii)

increases with the (positive) difference between my final payoff and my minimal
expectation payoff − how much more do I give myself than the minimum I can
expect from the game.

We now formalize these intuitions and present a concept of moral reference points that are
determined by observable features of feasible sets. For simplicity, we first use dictator games to
illustrate concepts but the model has more general applicability, as explained in section 7 on
strategic games with contractions. Our many applications of theory in this paper will all be to twoagent (dictator and strategic) games, but the definition of moral reference point can be extended to
n-agent environments, as shown in appendix B.
Let ( m, y ) denote an ordered pair of payoffs in which my payoff, m is that of the dictator
and your payoff, y is that of the recipient. Let the dictator’s opportunity set be a finite set F .
o

Let mo and y be the maximum feasible payoffs for the dictator and the recipient, that is

mo  max{m : (m, y)  F} and yo  max{ y : (m, y)  F}
The minimal expectations point, (m*, y* ) is defined by the dictator’s minimum payoff when the
recipient gets their maximum feasible payoff, y o and the recipient’s minimum payoff when the
o

dictator gets their maximum feasible payoff m , i.e.

m (F )  min{m :(m, y o ) F} and y (F)  min{y : (mo , y) F}.
Moral cost depends on the minimal expectations point as well as payoff entitlement from
the decision maker’s endowment. We propose as a moral reference point an ordered pair that
agrees with the minimal expectation on the second (recipient’s) payoff dimension and is a convex
combination of the minimal expectation and the initial endowment em on the first (dictator’s)
payoff dimension. Formally,

(*)

r F  ((1  )m (F )   em , y (F)),

for some  (0,1) . The weight on initial endowment may depend on a variety of things (such as
whether endowments were earned or assigned) but all of the analysis in this paper holds for any
value of  (0,1) . We use   1 2 in examples only because this makes it easy to visualize results.
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An illustration on how to locate moral reference points is provided here for the Give, Take,
and Symmetric action sets and Equal, Inequality, and Envy endowment treatments shown in Figure
4. With such downward-sloping budget lines, a moral reference point can be located by: (a) first,
find the minimal expectations point, (m*, y* ) by constructing a right triangle with the budget line
as the hypotenuse and the vertical and horizontal sides below and to the left of the budget line; (b)
second, find the midpoint of the line segment joining (m*, y* ) and e (the endowment), and (c)
finally, orthogonally project the midpoint onto the line segment joining (m*, y* ) and the most
selfish point. We illustrate this algorithm in Figure 4 for the Equal treatment in the experimental
design explained in full in section 4.
[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE: Moral Reference Points (Equal Treatments) ]
In the Equal-Symmetric treatment the endowment is at BQ and the feasible set contains
discrete points on the budget line extending from AQ to CQ . The minimal expectations point is
the lower left corner of the large triangle and the moral reference point is rS . In the Equal-Give
treatment the endowment is at point CQ and the budget line extends from BQ to CQ . The minimal
expectations point is the lower left corner of the small triangle and the moral reference point is rG
. Finally, in the Equal-Take treatment the budget line extends from BQ to CQ . In this case the
endowment is at BQ , so the minimal expectation and moral reference point are both at rT .
3.3 MMA and Data from Dictator Games in the Literature
As noted above, data from the Korenock, et al. (2014) experiment are inconsistent with existence
of any choice function, in particular with rational ones characterized by CCA. In contrast, their
data are consistent with MMA. In all of their treatments, the minimum expectations point is the
natural origin (because the fixed budget line intersects both axes). Therefore, changes in moral
reference points in their design are entirely determined by changes in endowment. The moral
reference points defined as in (*) for their several endowment treatments are shown in Figure 3
using  = ½. As the endowments move northwest along the budget line the moral reference points
move westwards along the horizontal axis from r1 to r3 to r6 to r8 to r9 , favoring the dictator less
and less. Moral monotonicity axiom, MMA requires dictator’s choices to decrease the amount
allocated to oneself from scenario 1 to 9, a pattern observed in this experiment.
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Turning attention back to the experiments reported by List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), we
note that while their data are consistent with CCA they also are consistent with MMA. Their
experimental designs, however, have little power for testing either CCA or MMA. We next explain
the design of an experiment intended to test MMA.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROTOCOL
4.1 Experimental Design
We now explain the design of an experiment that provides a direct test of the empirical implications
of MMA. Following List (2007), our design begins by introducing an action set in which the
dictator can either give to or take from the recipient’s initial endowment and compares outcomes
in this augmented game to those observed in dictator games in which the participant can only give
to, or take from, the recipient. We extend this line of inquiry by considering treatments that vary
the initial endowments but preserve the permissible set of actions.12 If choices are motivated by
final allocations only, as assumed in conventional rational choice theory, variation in the initial
endowments within a given feasible set should have no impact on observed dictator behavior.
Figure 5 shows three budget lines labeled “Inequality,” “Equal,” and “Envy.” The finite
feasible sets include discrete points on the lines. Labelling of the feasible sets reflects the location
of the midpoints B j , j  I , Q , E , on the lines. The Symmetric treatments have endowment at B j
and permit the dictator to give (move the allocation towards Aj ) or take (move the allocation
towards C j ). The Take treatments have endowment at B j and permit the dictator to take (move
the allocation towards C j ). The Give treatments have endowment at C j and permit the dictator to
give (move the allocation towards B j ). There are two prominent features of this design: (a) the
corresponding Take and Give treatments have the same feasible set [ B j , C j ] ; and (b) a Symmetric
treatment’s feasible set [ Aj , C j ] contains the corresponding Take and Give feasible set [ B j , C j ]
as a proper subset (a strict contraction).
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE: Feasible Sets]
The experimental design is 3  3: (Inequality, Equal, Envy)  (Symmetric, Take, Give).
In the Inequality-Give treatment (with endowment at point CI in the left panel of Figure 5): the
These treatments build upon work by Korenok et al. (2014) and Grossman and Eckel (2015), who employ a variant
of the dictator game to explore the effect of give or take actions on choices.
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recipient has an endowment of 3; the dictator has an endowment of 27 and can give up to 8 to the
recipient. In the Inequality-Take treatment (with endowment at point BI in the left panel): the
recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can take up to 8 from
the recipient. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment (with endowment at point BI in the left
panel): the recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can give
up to 8 or take up to 8. The Equal and Envy treatments change the locations of the (point B or
point C) endowments but preserve the Give, Take, or Symmetric action sets. In the Equal feasible
set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point BQ in the middle panel) is 15 for the recipient
and 15 for the dictator. In the Envy feasible set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point BE
in the right panel) is 19 for the recipient and 11 for the dictator.13
In the Inequality-Symmetric and Envy-Give treatments, the dictator faces an allocation
decision over a budget line that crosses the 45-degree line, as in most standard dictator games. In
the Equal-Take and Equal-Symmetric treatments, the initial endowment lies on the 45-degree line.
However, the treatments differ in that the budget line for the Equal-Take treatment lies on and
below the 45-degree line whereas the budget line for the Equal-Symmetric treatment crosses the
45-degree line.
The nine treatments provide a test of the central properties of our theory: monotonicity of
choice in both dimensions of moral reference point. Figure 6 shows the moral reference points for
our treatments. Note how they vary across treatments along horizontal and vertical lines.
[ FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE: Treatment Moral Reference Points ]
4.2 Protocol
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center at Georgia
State University using students recruited from the student body at Georgia State. When they agreed
to participate, subjects knew only that they would be in an economics experiment, but not the exact
nature of the experiment. Subjects were given as much time as they wanted to read instructions on
their computer monitors. After they were finished reading, summary instructions were projected
on a screen and read aloud by an experimenter to make clear that all subjects were given the same
information about the decision task. All subjects participated in two practice dictator decisions

13

Note that the sum of the dictator’s and recipient’s endowments is $30 in all treatments. Thus, as noted above for the
List (2007), Bardsley (2008), and Korenok et al. (2013) experiments, it would make no sense to assume dictator’s
choices are dependent on both dictator’s and recipient’s endowments.
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without payoffs to become familiar with both the underlying allocation task and the computer
interface. No information was given to subjects about others’ practice decisions. After the practice
decisions were completed, subjects were informed that the computer would randomly assign them
to be active decision makers or passive recipients and that this information would appear on their
screen before the start of the first actual round of play.
Subjects were further informed that each active subject would make two decisions while
paired with the same recipient and that one of the two decisions would be randomly selected for
payoff once both decision rounds were completed. It was explained that these pairings were
anonymous and that participants would not know the identity of the person with whom they were
paired. A subject made decisions in Give and Take action sets for the same (Equal or Inequality or
Envy) setting; or the subject made decisions in Symmetric and Give or Take action sets for the
same setting. The order of the games each active subject faced was independently randomly
selected. Subjects were asked to complete a short survey after all decisions were made. Once all
subjects had completed the survey, they were paid individually and in private their earnings for
the chosen decision round. Subject instructions and the survey are available online:
http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/instructions.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1 Overview
612 subjects (306 dictators) participated in the experiment. None of the dictators had previous
experience (as either dictator or recipient) in dictator games. Each session lasted approximately 50
minutes and each dictator made two decisions. The actual payoffs (from the randomly selected
payoff rounds) for dictators were: $19.46 (average) with the range $8 (minimum) to $27
(maximum). Average payoffs and transfers14 for all data from nine treatment cells are reported in
Table 1. Average transfers varied across treatments from a low $2.06 to three times as much, $6.12.
Average recipient payoffs varied across treatments from $7.19 to about twice as much, $13.64.
Less than 1/3 (166 out of 612) of observed choices correspond to the most selfish feasible
options and less than 1/5 (57 out of 306) of dictators appear selfish (i.e., choose the most selfish
option in both decisions). Data exhibit egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007) as almost all
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“Transfer” is defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimal expectations payoff. In a
Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the
amount the dictator does not take from the recipient. In a Symmetric treatment, the transfer is the amount not taken
plus the amount given, if any.
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choices (98%) are such that the dictator’s final payoff (weakly) exceeded recipient’s final payoff.15
All data from Give and Take treatments with feasible sets [Bk, Ck] are usable for testing
conventional rational choice theory and modified rational choice theory incorporating the Moral
Monotonicity Axiom (MMA). Choices from [Ak, Bk) in Symmetric treatments are not usable for
testing rational choice theory but there are few such choices; 94% (575 out of 612) of choices are
from sets [Bi, Ci] and are thus usable in testing CCA and MMA.
We begin with tests of conventional rational choice theory and MMA using only withinsubjects choice pairs. Subsequently, we conduct across-subjects data analysis to ascertain whether
observed dictators’ transfers are affected by moral reference points as predicted by MMA.
5.2 Consistency of Dictators’ Choices with Theoretical Models.
Each dictator made two decisions from the same (Inequality, Equal or Envy) environment: 96
dictators faced budget set [Bk, Ck] twice, in one Give action set and one Take action set; a different
group of 98 dictators faced budget set [Ak, Ck] in the Symmetric action set and budget set [Bk, Ck]
in the Give action set; and another group of 112 dictators faced budget set [Ak, Ck] in the
Symmetric action set and budget set [Bk, Ck] in the Take action set. We created a new variable,
Consistency, that takes value 0 if individual’s two decisions agreed with theoretical predictions.
When the theoretical prediction follows from CCA, 50.19% (135 out of 269; 95% C.I. is [0.44,
0.56]) of subjects made decisions that are consistent with CCA.16 When the theoretical prediction
follows from MMA, 78.07% (210 out of 269) of subjects made decisions that are consistent with
MMA. The 95% C.I. of fraction of choices consistent with CCA and MMA are, respectively, [0.44,
0.56] and [0.73, 0.83]. We conclude that:17
RESULT 1: MMA organizes our data better than CCA
5.3 Testing MMA: Changes in the Recipient’s Moral Reference Dimension
A different test of our theory uses between-subjects data. MMA predicts that the recipient’s payoff
increases in r2 when r1 is fixed. In contrast, convex preferences or CCA predict that changes in
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Dictator’s final payoff was strictly larger than the recipient’s payoff in 80% (489 out of 612) of choices.
Data from 37 subjects who gave in the Symmetric treatments are not included as CCA (or MMA) makes no
predictions for their choices in Give/Take treatments.
17
An earlier, working paper version of this paper (Cox et al. 2016) reports data for child subjects in a similar
experimental design to test the importance of moral reference points on choices. As with student data reported here,
data for children show that final allocations depend on both initial endowments and feasible actions. As such, dictator
choices by children violate the standard model of rational choice and any model that assumes convex preferences but
provide support for MMA.
16
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r2 should have no effect on the recipient’s payoffs. To test for r2 effects, we need to look across
environments and subjects.
To evaluate whether the recipient’s minimal expectations point influences allocations as
predicted under MMA, we estimate two Tobit models – one that conditions choice solely upon r2
and a second that augments this model to include demographic controls for the dictator (gender,
race, GPA, religion, major, study year). Each model controls for potential budget constraints
(common support across games with a given r1 ) by setting as a lower bound the lowest possible
payoff a recipient could receive in the common support and as an upper bound the highest possible
payoff a recipient could receive in the common support.
For standard models, the estimated coefficient on r2 should be equal to zero whereas MMA
predicts that recipient payoffs are increasing in r2 and thus a positive coefficient on this treatment
parameter. Table 2 presents results for the subset of choices from budget sets with r1 = 15.
[ TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE: Tests for Effects of Recipient Moral Reference Dimension ]

There are three treatments with the same r1 =15 but three different r2 levels: InequalitySymmetric ( r2 =3), Equal-Take ( r2 =7) and Envy-Give ( r2 =11), as shown in Figure 6. The
recipient’s average payoffs across the three treatments (see Table 1) increase as r2 increases: 9.12
(Inequality-Symmetric), 10.17 (Equal-Take) and 13.43 (Envy-Give). The feasible payoffs for the
recipient in these three treatments are integers in the sets: [3, 19] in Inequality-Symmetric, [7, 15]
in Equal-Take and [11, 19] in Envy-Give. The budget sets for Envy-Give and Equal-Take are both
contractions of the Inequality-Symmetric budget set. Note that set [11, 15] is included in all three
treatments. To control for constraints of budget sets on choices, we run Tobit regressions of
recipients’ final payoffs on data from the three treatments using 11 as the lower bound and 15 as
the upper bound. Table 3 reports Tobit estimates of the coefficient on r2 using models with and
without demographic control variables. Consistent with MMA, the estimates for r2 are positive
(p<0.001), which rejects the null hypothesis from CCA (that the estimate is 0) in favor of the
alternative hypothesis from MMA. Tests using between-subjects data for r1 = 11 and r1 = 19 lead
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to similar conclusions (using data from the two treatments with each of these r1 values).18 Thus,
using between-subjects data we conclude that:
RESULT 2: The experimental data are consistent with monotonicity in recipient’s moral
reference dimension.
5.4 Testing MMA: Moral Reference Points and Transfers
We next explore the effects of changing moral reference points on transfers, which capture the
dictator’s choices as defined in terms of “giving.”19 Differences in the support of feasible budget
sets across environments confounds our ability to use payoffs to test implications of MMA.20 To
see the problem, note for example that the dictator’s payoff that corresponds to the most selfish
feasible choice decreases from $27 (Inequality) to $23 (Equal) and down to $19 (Envy). Looking
at transfers (rather than payoffs) makes all data comparable because the set of feasible transfers is
invariant across our three environments (Inequality, Equality and Envy).
The feasible set of transfers is [0,8] in both Give and Take action sets and [0,16] in the
Symmetric action set for all three environments. Appendix C provides detailed derivations of the
implications of MMA and conventional theory for the effects of changing r1 and r2 on transfers.
However, the basic intuition underlying these formal derivations is as follows. In terms of
(recipient moral reference point dimension) r2 and dictator’s payoff m, any feasible transfer, t
satisfies t  30  r2  m .21 Conventional theory (CCA or convex preferences) requires that the
dictator’s chosen allocation, ( m  , y  ) be preserved in all budget sets that contain it. Because the
sum of payoffs is constant, such preservation is equivalent to keeping m constant, and therefore,
under CCA, we expect (a) zero r1 effect, and (b) negative one-to-one r2 effect on choice of transfer
amount, t*. In contrast, as shown in appendix C, MMA predicts: (c) negative r1 effect, and (d)
negative smaller (between -1 and 0) r2 effect on choice of transfer amount, t*.

18

Tobit regression of recipient’s payoff with demographics included in the list of regressors; estimated coefficients
of the dummy on the larger value of r2 are: 1.31 (p-value=0.032) for r1  11 and 1.56 (p-value=0.080) for r1  19 .

19

That is, in the Give action sets the transfer is the recorded subject’s choice. In the Take action set, taking x is by
design equivalent in terms of recipient’s payoff to “giving” 8-x, hence the transfer is 8 - x. Similarly, in the Symmetric
action set, the subject’s choice in terms of “giving” is 8-x if the subject takes x and 8+z if the subject gives z.
20
By design, feasible budget sets shift northwest to the advantage of the recipient as we move from Inequality to Equal
and then from Equal to Envy.
21

The recipient’s final payoff is

y  r2 t in every treatment and the dictator’s payoff is m  30 y  30 r2 t .
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We have the following testable hypotheses that allow us to evaluate whether transfers in
our experiment are better organized by CCA or MMA:

Hr1 : Marginal effects of r1 on transfers: 0 (CCA) or negative (MMA)

Hr2 : Marginal effects of r2 on transfers: -1 (CCA) or between -1 and 0 (MMA)
The mean transfers are 4.99 (Inequality, r2 =3), 3.24 (Equal, r2 =7) and 2.37 (Envy, r2 =11).22 This
decreasing pattern is predicted by both CCA and MMA. However, the rate of decrease is one-half
of the size predicted by CCA. Table 2 reports results of a Tobit regression that allows us to estimate
the effect of changing moral reference points on observed transfers. The list of regressors includes
dictator’s ( r1 ) and recipient’s ( r2 ) coordinates of moral reference points of budget sets and, in
model (2), demographic controls. As each dictator made two choices, we cluster standard errors.
As a robustness check, Table 2 also presents results from a Hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) which
allows for the effects of moral reference points to differ along the extensive (whether to make a
positive transfer) and intensive (the amount of any positive transfer) margins.
As noted in the first row of Table 3, the estimated coefficient on r1 is negative and
significantly different from 0. The dependence of transfers on r1 rejects CCA in favor of MMA.
The estimate of r2 , in row two of Table 3, is negative. The Wald test rejects the CCA hypothesis
that the estimate equals -1.23 The estimates are consistent with MMA and are robust to both the
inclusion of demographics in the regression and the use of a Hurdle model.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE: Testing r1 and r2 Effects on Transfers ]
This provides our second result on effects of moral reference point on transfers:
RESULT 3: CCA is rejected in favor of MMA.
In summary, our data provides empirical support for MMA predictions of how changes in the
moral reference points affect transfers.
5.5 Alternative Models
We briefly look at implications of alternative models of behavior: selfish or social preferences,
reference dependence (Koszegi and Rabin 2006), and sharing and sorting (Lazear, et al. 2012).

22

23

Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-squared=30.25, p-value=0.001; for each subject, the data point is the mean of two transfers.
F(1,610)=30.50 (p-value=0.000) for the test for effect of change in r1  0 . For the joint CCA hypothesis (effect

of change in

r1  0 and effect of change in r2  1 ), F(2,610)=39.03 (p-value=0.000).
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Selfish Preferences: Two-thirds of the transfers are positive and four out of five of our
dictators made at least one positive transfer. Any feasible non-zero transfer reduces a dictator’s
payoff; so, this model predicts a null transfer, and hence, changes in r1 or r2 will have no effect.
Parameter estimates for both r1 and r2 are statistically significant, rejecting selfish behavior.

Convex Social Preferences: All prominent models of social preferences, including
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin
(Charness and Rabin 2002), CES (Andreoni and Miller 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and
Sadiraj 2007) assume convex upper contour sets. Our data reject convex preference theory, so
these social preferences models are also rejected.

Reference Dependent Model. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of reference
dependence that has recently seen a surge in applied work. Predictions of this model for our games
are similar to standard rational choice theory because, in deterministic settings, optimal
“consumption” derived for the conventional preferences model is the “preferred personal
equilibrium” in the reference dependent model.24 Because our data reject conventional theory, the
reference dependent model is also rejected.

Sharing and Sorting. Lazear et al. (2012) offer a model of sharing that depends on the
environment, u(D, m, y) where D takes value 1 when the environment allows sorting and 0
otherwise. In all of our treatments sorting is not available (i.e., people cannot sort in or out of
participating in the games), hence implications of their model for play in our games are similar to
standard preference theory, which is rejected by our data. These comparisons suggest:
RESULT 4: The experimental data is inconsistent with an array of behavioral models
that have been used to explain sharing behavior.
To summarize, our data provide evidence at odds with standard rational choice theory; the data are
also at odds with a suite of alternative behavioral models that have been used to explain sharing.
Viewed in its totality, we thus believe our data provides compelling evidence that objectively
defined moral reference points matter and influence choice in a manner consistent with MMA.
6. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR OTHER TYPES OF DICTATOR GAMES
To formalize the ways in which moral reference points may influence decision-making in dictator
games, we introduced the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA) and applied it to analyze data from
our experiment. Yet, MMA has broader implications for choice in a range of related experiments
24

See Proposition 3 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, pg.1145).
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including standard (give-only) dictator games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), other dictator games
that compare the effect of give versus take actions on choices (Korenok et al. 2014; Cox et al.,
2016), the “bully” dictator game (Krupka and Weber 2013), dictator games with outside options
(Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012), and dictator games where property rights and
endowments are earned (Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Korenok et al., 2017).
6.1 MMA and WARP
As previously mentioned, Andreoni and Miller (2002) conducted dictator game experiments that
varied underlying budget sets and applied the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP)
to analyze the consistency of choices in their setting. Figure 7 illustrates two budget sets like those
that the dictator can face in the Andreoni and Miller design. Let point a denote the endowment on
the steeper line and point b denote the endowment on the flatter line. Further, consider the shaded
quadrilateral that is the intersection of sets bounded by the steeper and flatter budget lines. Viewed
through the lens of MMA, the shaded quadrilateral set can be considered a feasible set with
endowment at point a. The minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) for all three feasible sets.
Therefore, the moral reference points for the three feasible sets are on the horizontal axis, halfway
between 0 and the respective endowment points. The moral reference point r b for the budget set
represented by the flatter budget line is more favorable to the dictator than the moral reference
point r a for the set represented by the steeper budget line.
[ FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE: MMA and WARP ]
Now consider two choices A and B from the original sets that violate the weak axiom of
revealed preference (WARP). Suppose that the dictator chooses A on the steeper budget line. Then
MMA (see Proposition 1) requires that A also be chosen from the quadrilateral set because it is a
contraction of the feasible set represented by the steeper line that preserves the moral reference
point. Suppose that B is chosen from the lower flat triangle. MMA requires that the choice in the
quadrilateral (which is also a contraction of the lower flat triangle) allocates to the dictator less
than B does, because r a is to the left of r b . But this contradicts the choice of A from the
quadrilateral set. Thus, any pair of choices of type A and B that violate WARP also violate MMA.
In fact, MMA places tighter restrictions on data than does WARP (e.g., in Figure 7 WARP implies
point A must be northwest of the intersection whereas MMA implies it must be west of point B).
6.2 Give and Take: MMA vs. Warm Glow
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment to test the theoretical model of warm glow
developed by Korenok et al. (2013). In particular, the authors explore the effects of changing
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endowments and framing actions as giving to or taking from the recipient. Korenok et al. (2014)
explain that data from their experiment is inconsistent with the predictions of their theory which,
in this instance, are the same as the predictions of the conventional rational choice model. We have
explained above that their data are consistent with MMA.25
6.3 MMA and Bully Games
MMA predicts both dictator game choices and social norms elicited by Krupka and Weber (2013).
In their experiment, the moral reference point is (5, 0) in the standard dictator game and (2.5, 0) in
the bully dictator game. Hence, MMA requires choices in the bully treatment to be drawn from a
distribution that is less favorable to the dictator than the distribution of choices in the standard
game. Therefore, we expect a higher amount allocated to the recipient and a positive estimate of
the bully treatment in an ordered logistic regression. The reported mean amounts allocated to the
recipients are $2.46 (standard) and $3.11 (bully) and the coefficient estimate for the bully treatment
is significantly positive (see their Table 2).
Moreover, the distribution of elicited norms reported in Krupka and Weber’s Table 1 are
also consistent with MMA. A paired t-test of the two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of no
effect (implied by CCA) in favor of the MMA-consistent alternative (approval of higher
allocations to recipients). Hence, both actual choices and elicited beliefs in Krupka and Weber
(2013) are consistent with MMA and highlight the importance of moral reference points.
6.4 MMA and Outside Options
Lazear, et al. (2012) report an extended experimental design for dictator games that includes an
outside option that allows subjects to opt out of the dictator game. Their Experiment 1 is a betweensubjects design in which one group of subjects plays a “distribute $10” dictator game and another
group of subjects can choose an outside option, that pays the dictator $10 and the other subject $0,
or choose to play the distribute $10 dictator game.26 The Lazear, et al. Experiment 2 is a withinsubjects design including several decisions with one selected randomly for payoff. In Decision 1,
25

MMA is also consistent with the results from the meta-analysis in Zhang and Ortmann (2014) who find that the
introduction of a take option leads to lower final payouts for the recipient. We should note however, that Dreber et al.,
(2013) report aggregate data patterns across give and take versions of the dictator game that appear to be at odds with
the predictions of MMA. However, as noted in Zhang and Ortmann (2014, fn. 9) the analysis in Dreber et al. (2013)
relies upon a normalized metric of sharing/giving that codes transfers in the Take only treatment as positive instead
of negative. Further, it is important to note that there is imbalance in key demographics such as gender and age across
treatments in Dreber et al. (2013). Since such factors have been shown to influence the amount a dictator is willing to
share, it is not clear how to interpret differences in the normalized amount shared with the recipient in their data.
26
In sessions run in Barcelona the pie was €10 while sessions in Berkeley used a $10 pie. The text of the paper uses
the subject decision task description as an assignment to “divide $10 (€10)” while the subject instructions use the
wording “distribute $10 (€10)”.
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subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game. In Decision 2, subjects can sort out of the $10 dictator
game, and be paid $10 (with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $10
dictator game. In other decision tasks, subjects can sort out of a $S dictator game, and be paid $10
(with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $S dictator game. Values of S
varied from 10.50 to 20.27
Explaining behavior of subjects in Experiment 2 who sorted into a S > 10 dictator game
and kept more than 10 for themselves is straightforward. A more interesting behavior is that many
subjects sorted out, and were paid 10, when they could have sorted into a S > 10 dictator game and
retained more than 10 for themselves (and/or more than 0 for the other). For example, in the S =
11 game, the outside option pays (dictator, other) payoffs (10,0) whereas Pareto-dominating
payoffs such as (11,0), (10.50, 0.50) and (10,1) are available to a subject who sorts into the dictator
game. The reluctant/willing sharers model developed by Lazear et al. (2012) is consistent with
behavior patterns in the experiment. That model is a utility function with three arguments: own
payoff, other’s payoff, and a binary indicator variable with value 1 for the sharing (dictator game)
environment and value 0 for the non-sharing (outside option) environment. This type of behavior
is consistent with our moral cost model in which choosing the outside option allows the decision
maker to avoid moral costs from making the sharing decision whereas choosing to play the game
involves this cost, as we now explain.
A subject has the right to choose the ordered pair of payoffs (10,0) by sorting out. This
provides a clear endowment for the two-step game that includes the option of sorting in and paying
the moral cost of making a sharing decision. Let S j denote that amount of money that can be
distributed in treatment j . Since the dictator’s sharing options include 0 and S j , the minimal
expectations point for the two-stage game is the natural origin. Hence the moral reference point if
the player sorts in is (r1, r2 ) = ( 12 10,0) . Let preferences consistent with MMA be represented by a
utility function u(m  r1, y  r2 ) . Substituting the budget constraint m  S j  y and the moral
reference point (5,0) the decision problem for our agent becomes max y u(S j  y  5, y) . The MMA
model is consistent with behavior by an agent who chooses the (10,0) outside option rather than
sorting in to play a distribute S > 10 dictator game with feasible payoffs that Pareto-dominate
(10,0) contained in its budget set.

27

The experiment included anonymity and no-anonymity treatments.
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Here we provide an example using a simple utility function, u(m, y)  m   y . By sorting
out, a subject can avoid the moral cost of making the sharing decision, obtain payoff allocation
(10,0), and utility V ( out )  10    0. If the player sorts in then she incurs moral cost of making
the sharing decision, instantiated in the model by the moral reference point (r1, r2 )  (5,0) and
MMA. The decision-maker’s optimization problem for the dictator game is
max y[0,S ] u ( m  r1 , y  r2 )  max y[0,S ] ( S  y  5  

y) .

The optimal choice is y   / 4 and the value of sorting in is V ( in )  S  5   2 / 4 . Comparing
o

2

it to the value of sorting out, V ( out )  10 , one has:
1. Any agent with (*)   4(15  S) prefers sorting out and realizing payoff (10,0) to sorting
2

in and being able to choose Pareto-dominating payoffs.
2. As S increases, inequality S  5   2 / 4  10 becomes more likely to be satisfied and therefore
the fraction of subjects sorting in increases, as observed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 in Lazear et al. (2012) is a between-subjects design in which one group of subjects
play a distribute $10 dictator game and another group of subjects can sort out of the $10 dictator
game, and be paid $10, or sort in and play the distribute $10 dictator game. The extended game
with the outside option is modeled as above with the MMA model using the unambiguous (10,0)
endowment provided by the outside option. The distribute $10 dictator game without outside
options is a commonly used protocol for dictator games in which neither the dictator nor the
recipient has a clearly assigned property right. This form of dictator game protocol is widely
viewed as appropriate for research on sharing behavior but it does have an ambiguous endowment,
as explained by Hoffman et al. (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996).28 Experiment 1
data are consistent with predictions from the MMA model which follow from interpreting the 10
available for distribution as endowments to the dictator and recipient of (10  z, z) , with z  0 .
6.5 MMA and Earned Endowments
Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) report an experiment that includes treatments whereby initial
endowments are determined in a first stage. In the receiver earnings treatment, the recipient
determined the initial endowment by their performance on a test that used 20 questions pulled from
the Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) or the Graduate Record Examinations

28

The exact wording in the Hoffmann et al. subject instructions is “divide $10”. The exact wording in the Lazear, et
al. subject instructions is “distribute the $10 (€10)” although the text uses the wording “divide $10 (€10)”.
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(GRE). Depending upon the number of questions answered correctly, the recipient was provided
an initial endowment of either CAN $10, CAN $20, or CAN $40. In the second stage, the dictator
decided how much of this endowment they would like to take from the recipient. The dictator
earnings treatment differed along two dimensions. First, the initial endowment was earned by the
dictator’s performance on the 20 question exam. Second, the dictator’s decision in the second stage
was to determine how much of the initial endowment they would like to give to the recipient.
Across both versions of the game, the minimal expectations point is (0, 0). Therefore, as in
the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment, changes in moral reference points across the two treatments
are entirely determined by changes in endowment. Focusing on pairs for whom the initial
endowment is CAN $40, the moral reference point is (0,0) in the receiver-earning treatment and
(20, 0) in the dictator-earning treatment. MMA would thus predict that the amount allocated to the
recipient under the recipient earnings treatment is greater than the amount allocated to the recipient
under the dictator earnings treatment. Across all three wealth levels, the mean amounts allocated
to recipients in the receiver-earning treatment are greater than the mean amounts allocated to
recipients in the dictator-earning treatment, which is a pattern of results at odds with CCA but
consistent with the predictions of MMA.
Korenok et al. (2017) extend this line of inquiry by adding a set of survey questions
designed to elicit participants’ feelings of ownership over the initial endowments. As in Oxoby
and Spraggon (2008), treatments varied whether the initial endowment was earned by the recipient
or dictator and the subsequent framing of the task as either give to or take from the recipient.
Across all wealth levels, the mean amount allocated to the recipient under the recipient earnings
treatment was greater than the amount allocated to the recipient under the dictator earnings
treatment. Moreover, dictators felt a stronger sense of ownership over the endowment than did
recipients in the dictator earnings treatment and vice versa in the receiver earnings treatment.
Hence, both actual choices and feelings of ownership over endowments depend on property rights
and initial allocations. Such patterns are consistent with MMA and highlight the importance of
moral reference points.
7. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR PLAY IN GAMES WITH CONTRACTIONS
We next extend our discussion to illustrate the implications of MMA for play of strategic games
involving contractions. Games that have been studied in previous literature include: (1) the
moonlighting game and its contraction, the investment game, (2) carrot and stick games and a
contraction in the positive domain (carrot game) as well as a contraction in the negative domain,
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(stick game). Together with dictator games, these games have been widely used in the literature to
measure different aspects of social behaviors, including trust and cooperation. MMA has different
implications for play of these games than does CCA or a stronger traditional assumption such as
convex preferences.
7.1 Investment and Moonlighting Games
The investment game (Berg, et al. 1995, and hundreds of other papers) can be constructed from
the moonlighting game (Abbink, et al. 2000, and scores of other papers) by contracting the feasible
choice sets of the first and second movers.29 CCA and MMA have different implications for such
contractions and allow a way to distinguish between the two models using observed choice.
First, we argue that, for any given positive amount received, the second mover’s (SM’s)
choice is the same in the moonlighting and investment Games (with the same initial endowments).
This is the prediction of CCA as well as MMA because the reference point for the SM opportunity
sets is the same in the two games.
Next, we argue that for any first mover (FM) who sends a non-negative amount in the
moonlighting game, CCA requires that he choose the same amount to send in the investment game.
MMA, in contrast, requires him to choose a larger amount to send in the investment game. The
reason for this difference is that the moral reference point for the FM opportunity set is more
favorable to the FM in the moonlighting game than in the investment game.
An implication of the two statements is that MMA predicts more money being sent by all FMs in
the investment game than in the moonlighting game whereas CCA makes this prediction only
for FMs who take in the moonlighting game. Yet it is important to note that this latter “prediction”
results solely from the constraint that prevents taking in the investment game, not from agent
preferences in and of themselves.
Let e denote the endowment of each FM and each SM. The amount sent by the FM is
denoted by s. If s is positive it is multiplied by k >1 to obtain the amount received by the SM.
Taking is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting game, if s is negative then the
multiplier is 1 to obtain the amount taken from the SM. The amount returned by the SM is denoted
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In the moonlighting game (Abbink, et al. 2000), both players are endowed with the same amount of money. The
first mover (FM) can give or take money from the second mover (SM); the maximum amount that can be given is the
full endowment whereas the maximum amount that can be taken is one-half the endowment. Money given by FM is
tripled by the experimenter but money taken is not transformed. After the SM is informed of the FM’s choice, he/she
can also give or take money from the FM. Each currency unit (CU) taken costs SM 1/3 CU whereas each CU given
costs SM one CU. The investment game is a contraction in that FM and SM can only give and not take.
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by r. Returning a negative amount is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting
game, when r is negative it costs the SM r/k to take r from the FM.

SM opportunity sets across the two games: Let the SM be in information set M s for some
non-negative amount s sent by the FM in the moonlighting game. The M s set contains costly




options for the SM but can increase/decrease FM’s monetary payoff: M s  M s  M s where
M s  (e  s  r,e  ks  r) : r [0,ks]

M s  (e  s  r,e  ks  r / k) : r [(e  s) / k,0)

Consider the SM’s choice in M s in the moonlighting game when the FM sends a nonnegative amount. Consistent with observed behavior30 (as well as Pareto efficiency), the amount

returned will be from M s .

What are CCA and MMA predictions for SM’s choice in the investment game, at
information set I s given the same nonnegative s? In the investment game the SM’s choices can
only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by decreasing own monetary payoff,

I s  (e  s  r,e  ks  r) : r [0,ks]




Thus I s  M s  M s . CCA requires the same rs  M s to be the SM’s choice in the
investment game. This is also the MMA prediction because sets M s and I s have the same moral
reference point, with coordinate e  s for the FM and e  ks / 2 for the SM.

FM choices across the two games: In the moonlighting game, the FM can send money to
the SM or take up to one-half of the SM’s initial endowment. Any positive amount sent (s > 0) is
multiplied by k > 1. Any amount taken (s < 0) is not transformed (it is one for one). The FM
choice set is

M  M  M

where

M   {(e  s,e  ks) : s [0,e]}
M   {(e  s,e  s) : s [e / 2,0)}

30



Only 2 (out of 46) second movers who did not have money taken from them by first movers choose rs  M s .
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Suppose the FM’s choice in the moonlighting game is some non-negative s M . In the investment

game, the FM can only send money to the SM. So, I  M  M as the FM choice set is

I  {(e  s,e  ks) : s [0,e]}

CCA requires the non-negative amount s M to be the FM’s choice in the investment game
when it is the choice in the moonlighting game because the feasible set in the investment game is
a contraction of the feasible set in the moonlighting game. In contrast, MMA implies that the FM
will send more in the investment game because the moral reference point, (e / 2, e) in set

I is more

favorable to the SM than is the moral reference point (e / 2, e / 2) in set M .

Implications for game play: Both CCA and MMA imply that, for any positive amount
received, the SM’s choices in the moonlighting and investment games are identical. We distinguish
between two types of FMs: the ones who send in the moonlighting game and the ones who take.
For a FM who takes in the moonlighting game, by design of the two games the FM must send
more in the investment game. For a FM who does not take in the moonlighting game, we have
shown above that CCA predicts the same amount being sent in the two games whereas MMA
predicts a larger amount being sent in the investment game.

Existing data that provide empirical support for MMA: We have analyzed data from an
investment game experiment reported in Cox (2004) and a moonlighting game experiment
reported in Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008). These two experiments used the same initial
endowments e  (10,10), the same multiplier k (=3) and were run by the same experimenter. Data
from these experiments are consistent with the implications of MMA and inconsistent with the
implications of CCA, as follows.
We have data from 64 subjects who participated in the investment game and 130
subjects (66 within-subjects design and 64 between-subjects design) who participated in the
moonlighting game.

FM choices: Using only FM data with non-negative amounts sent, we find that the means
of the amounts sent are 5.97 (IG) and 4 (MG) and significantly different (t-test, p-value= 0.026.31
Therefore the FM data are consistent with the above implications of MMA but inconsistent with
implications of CCA.

31

If we look only at Send > 0, means are 7.35 (IG) and 4.84 (MG) and significantly different (t-test, p-value=0.004).
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SM choices: Estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of censored regressions for SM
choices at information sets with “FM not taking” (send  0 , N=78 ) are32

E(r s )  0.67*** (0.15)  s  0.41(0.29)  s  DM  0.23(1.30)  DM
Insignificance of the coefficients for DM and s  DM , “Moon” and “Send*Moon,” are consistent
with the (same) implication of MMA and CCA, as discussed above.
Taken jointly, we conclude that differences in play across the moonlighting and investment
games are inconsistent with standard rational choice theory. Changes in the first mover’s moral
reference points across games leads to greater amounts shared in the investment game, a finding
that is consistent with the predictions of MMA.
7.2 Carrot, Stick, and Carrot/Stick Games
Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) look at effects of rewards and punishments on
cooperation by studying behavior in three games: the carrot game that offers incentives only in
terms of rewards, the stick game that allows only for negative incentives (punishment) and the
carrot and stick (C&S) game that offers players both types of incentives. The two single incentive
games are natural contractions of the C&S game. We argue that for any given positive amount
received the SM’s predicted choice is the same in the C&S and carrot game. This is the prediction
of CCA as well as MMA and arises as the moral reference point of the SM’s opportunity set is the
same in the two games. Next, we argue that for any positive amount received the SM’s predicted
choice is less malicious in the stick game than in the C&S game according to MMA because the
moral reference point in the stick game favors the SM.
Let e = (240,0) in cents denote the endowments of the FM and the SM. The amount sent, s
by the FM is the amount received by the SM and can take values from [40, 240] in all three games.
The return, rs by the SM can be positive (carrot), negative (stick) or either (C&S game) as
returning a negative amount is not feasible in the carrot game whereas returning a positive amount
is not feasible in the stick game. Despite the sign of the amount returned, the FM receives 5 rs .

SM choices across the three games: For the amount s sent by the FM let the SM feasible
s
s
s
sets be denoted by M cs in the C&S game, M c in the carrot game and M s in the stick game such

32

Send > 0 (N=64): E (r s )  0.65*** (0.17)  s  0.42(0.36)  s  DM  0.14(1.87)  DM
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s
s
s
s
that M cs  M c  M s . The M cs set consists of options that are all costly for the SM but can

increase or decrease FM’s monetary payoff. The sets are:

M cs  (240  s  5r, s  r ) : r  [0, s]
M ss  (240  s  5r, s  r ) : r  [max{(240  s) / 5, s},0]
Let rcs be the SM’s choice in the C&S game when the FM sends amount s. CCA and MMA
predictions for SM’s choice when the FM sends amount s are as follows:
a. Carrot game: In this game the SM’s choices can only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. CCA requires that if the SM choice in the C&S game is
s
positive, i.e. rcs  M c then it remains a most preferred return in the carrot game. This is also

s
s
the MMA prediction because sets M cs and M c have the same moral reference point,

 240  s as the FM coordinate and (s /2) as the SM coordinate. Andreoni et al. (2003, Figure
7) find larger demand for rewards in the C&S game than in the carrot game which is
inconsistent with both CCA and MMA.

b. Stick game: In this game the SM’s choices can only decrease the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. CCA requires that if the SM’s most preferred choice in the
s
C&S game is to reduce the FM’s monetary payoff, i.e., rcs  M s then it remains a most

preferred return in the stick game. MMA, however, predicts in the stick game a smaller return
in absolute value because the moral reference point favors the SM as its coordinate is s (rather
than s / 2 ) whereas the FM’s coordinate remains the same,  240  s  . Andreoni et al. (2003,
Figure 6) report a result they characterize as “surprising” (pg. 898) that demand for
punishment is larger in the C&S game than in the stick game. This result is predicted by MMA
but is inconsistent with CCA.
Taken in its totality, data from Andreoni et al. (2013) provides evidence inconsistent with standard
rational choice theory and mixed support for MMA. Importantly, however, MMA can rationalize
a data pattern that Andreoni et al. (2013) label as surprising, that the demand for punishment is
greater in the C&S game than in the stick game. As the moral reference point for the SM in the
stick game is more favorable than in the C&S game, which is what one would expect under MMA.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When faced with the opportunity to share resources with a stranger, when and why do we give?
The dictator game has emerged as a key data generator to provide researchers with a simple
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approach for eliciting other-regarding preferences in a controlled setting. The game has worked
well in the sense that we now understand giving behaviors at a much deeper level. What has been
less well explored is whether received results violate the basic foundations of economic theory.
As we explain, recent dictator game experiments reveal that choices of subjects in specific
pairs of dictator games are inconsistent with convex preference theory (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008;
Cappelen et al., 2013) and inconsistent with (more general) rational choice theory (Korenok, et al.,
2014) characterized by the Contraction Consistency Axiom (CCA).
The designs of experiments that produce the anomalous data suggest how to extend rational
choices theory to increase its empirical validity. The Korenok, et al. (2014) experimental design
and data suggest that choices depend on endowment in ways not captured by conventional theory.
The List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) experimental designs and data suggest that choices depend
on minimum and maximum feasible payoffs in ways not captured by conventional theory. In this
spirit, we propose moral reference points and a Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA) that models
dependence on endowment and minimal expectations payoffs. An implication of MMA is
preservation of the contraction property of rational choice theory for feasible sets and subsets that
have the same moral reference point. The moral reference points we propose are observable
features of feasible sets, not subjective reference points that can be adjusted ex post to fit new data.
We report an experiment designed to test the central feature of the new model:
monotonicity in choice with respect to distinct dimensions of observable moral reference points.
Data from the experiment imply rejection of CCA in favor of MMA.
The MMA model, however, has more general applicability. We explain how it can
rationalize data from other types of dictator games in the literature. We also explain how the model
has implications for play of strategic games involving contractions of feasible sets that differ from
implications of conventional theory.
The model and experimental data lead us to conclude that moral reference points play a
major role in the decision to act generously. As a whole, these findings highlight the importance
of revisiting standard models to explore the role of moral reference points in a broader array of
choice settings. In the paper, we have provided an explanation of how the theory of moral reference
points is predictive of received findings in a range of economic games designed to elicit social and
cooperation behaviors. In this manner, we view our results as having both positive and normative
import. For empiricists and practitioners, the results herein provide an indication that moral costs
can play an important role in welfare calculations and program evaluation.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics

Inequality

Equal

Envy

Give
Take
Symmetric
Give
Take
Symmetric
Give
Take
Symmetric

Average Transfer
4.54 (2.96)
4.19 (3.34)
6.12 (4.95)
2.65 (2.24)
3.17 (2.88)
3.94 (3.52)
2.43 (1.65)
2.06 (1.85)
2.64 (2.55)

Nobs
61
81
82
66
58
62
67
69
66

Average. Final Payoffs
(22.46, 7.54)
(22.81, 7.19)
(20.88, 9.12)
(20.35, 9.65)
(19.83, 10.17)
(19.06, 10.94)
(16.57, 13.43)
(16.94, 13.06)
(16.36, 13.64)

“Ave. Transfer” is the amount by which the average recipient’s payoff chosen by dictators exceeds the recipient’s
minimum expectations payoff (standard deviations in parentheses).

Hurdle Model
(1)
(2)

Dep. Var: Recipient’s
Final Payoff

0.134
(0.031)

r2 [  0]

0.136
(0.031)

constant
Demographics
Log-likelihood
Observations

no
-247.28

yes
-244.15

r1

Table 2. Tests for Effects of Recipient Moral Reference Dimension (

=15)

Tobit Model
(1)
(2)
0.674
(0.187)
6.145
(1.548)
no
-261.28

207

0.668
(0.186)
6.955
(2.417)
yes
-258.30
207

Notes: MMA predicted sign in square brackets. Entries are average marginal effects (Hurdle Model) and
coefficients (Tobit model). Lower and upper bounds in regressions are 11 and 15. Nr of observations: 107
(left-censored), 58 (right-censored) and 42 (un-censored). Standard errors in parentheses. Demographics
include gender, race, GPA, religion, major and study year.

Table 3. Moral Reference Points and Transfers
Dep. Var: Transfer

r1 [  0 ]
r2 [   1 ]

Hurdle

Model

Model

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

-0.058
(0.027)

-0.055
(0.027)

-0.098
(0.047)

-0.104
(0.047)

-0.319
(0.047)

-0.314
(0.047)

no

yes

-0.497
(0.091)
7.918
(1.301)
no

-0.487
(0.090)
7.733
(1.547)
yes

constant
Demographics
Observations

Tobit

612

612

Notes: MA predicted sign in brackets. Entries are average marginal effects (Hurdle Model) and coefficients
(Tobit model). Lower and upper bounds are 0 and 8. Nr of observations: 166 (left-censored), 95 (rightcensored) and 351 (un-censored). Robust standard errors (clustered at subject ID level) in parentheses.
Demographics include gender, race, GPA, religion, major and study year.
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Figure 1. Histograms using Data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)
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Bardsley (2008) ‐ Experiment 2
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Notes: In the upper panel, Baseline refers to the standard dictator game in which dictators can choose to give
$0 to $5 to the receivers. The Take $1 refers to the dictator game in which the feasible set is augmented to
allow taking $1 from the recipient. In the lower panel, the Giving Game 2 refers to a standard dictator game
in which dictators can choose to give $0 to $7 to receivers. Taking Game 2 refers to a game that is augmented
to allow taking $2 from the recipient.

Figure 2. Example of Choices with non-Convex Preferences
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Figure 3. Endowments, Average Choices, and Moral Reference Points for Korenok, et al.

Figure 4. Moral Reference Points in Treatment Q
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Figure 5. Feasible Sets: [B, C] for Give or Take, [A, C] for Symmetric
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Notes: This figure portrays the feasible allocations for each treatment and action set. Participants in the
Give or Take action sets can choose from [B, C], while participants in the Symmetric action set can choose
from [A, C]. Actual feasible choices are ordered pairs of integers on the line segments.

Figure 6. Moral Reference Points for Treatments
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Figure 7. MMA Implies WARP for the Andreoni and Miller Experiment
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let f belong to both F and G . Consider any g from G * . As G and F have the same moral
*

g
f
reference point, r  r , MMA requires that gi  fi and gi  fi , i . These inequalities can be

simultaneously satisfied if and only if g = f , i.e. f belongs to G * which concludes the proof
for Property  M . Note, though, that any choice g in G * must coincide with f , an implication
of which is G * must be a singleton. So, if the intersection of F * and G is not empty then choices
satisfy Property  M .
Appendix B. Moral Reference Point in the Presence of N Players
Endowments for n agents will typically be specified, hence are observable. Identification of
observable minimal expectations payoffs for n  2 players can proceed as follows. Let y denote
the vector of payoffs of n players. Let the feasible set be a finite set F . Let y oj be the maximum
feasible payoff for player j (  1,2, n ), that is
y oj ( F )  max{ y j | y  F }
F
The minimal expectations point, y* is defined as follows. For each player j , define player i ’s

minimal expectation payoff with respect to j as
y*Fij  min{ yi | ( y j , y oj )  F }
F
Let Si  {y*ij
: j  i) be the set of i ’s minimal expectation points. Naturally, player i expects her

payoff to be no smaller than the smallest element in Si ; thus

y*iF  min Si , which is the ith element

F
of the vector y* .

Appendix C. Effect of Moral Reference Point on Transfers
Let “Transfer” be defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimum
expectations payoff. In a Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the
recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator does not take from the
recipient. In a Symmetric treatment, the transfer is the amount not taken plus the amount given, if
any. In all treatments, the dictator makes a choice of an amount to give or take that we here
represent by a transfer, t  T , where T=[0,16] in a Symmetric treatment (Envy, Equal and
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Inequality) and T=[0,8] in the Give/Take scenarios (Envy, Equal and Inequality). The feasible set
is

X   m, y  |m  y  30, y  y0  t, t  T 
where  m , y  are dictator’s and recipient’s final monetary payoffs and y0 is recipient’s minimum
feasible payoff. Let e and r be the initial endowment and the moral reference point of set X, that
is, r1  12  max T  e1  and r2  y0 . If the dictator chooses t  T then the recipient’s and dictator’s
final payoff are y  t  r2 and m  30  y  30  (t  r2 ) .





CCA Choices: Let P*  m* , y * be the dictator’s chosen allocation of $30. Then when
the dictator faces any subset of X that contains P* , by CCA the dictator’s choice of transfer t o is
such that t o  r2  y* . Thus, if r2 increases then the chosen transfer, t o decreases by the same
*
*
amount for as long as the set X contains P . Next, preservation of y under CCA is not affected
*
by r1 as y does not depend on r1 . Thus we have the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis CCA: The chosen transfer, t o is not affected by r1 and t r / r2  1.
MMA Choices: Let dictator’s choice satisfy MMA. One way to think about a dictator who
is “socially” cautious is that he can claim social credits only for the transfer part, t r rather than all
of the recipient’s payoff, r2  t r (because the recipient gets at least r2 from the experimenter no
matter what the dictator chooses).
By MMA, dictator’s final chosen payoff increases in r1 . Because the total budget is fixed
(at $30), the dictator’s payoff increasing in r1 implies that the recipient’s payoff is decreasing in

r1 , which for fixed r2 implies a decreasing transfer, t r . It follows that the chosen transfer t r must
decrease in r1 . Next, by MMA, recipient’s payoff, r2  t r increases in r2 , which implies

1  t r / r  0 . Thus we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis MMA: The chosen transfer, t r decreases in r1 and t r / r2  1.

